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Introduction
In the heat of  legislative action,  compromises  are often made the net
effect of which  is  clear  only as  programs are implemented.  The  Food
Security Act of 1985  (the Farm Bill)  is  a good example of such unintended
side-effects.  The  cost of the bill was  intentionally underestimated to
ensure passage.  Low market prices and high deficiency payments  encouraged
high  levels  of participation, making substantial budget exposure an
inevitable  outcome.  Recently reported cost  overruns  should therefore  come
as no  surprise  (although their size has surprised even the most pessimistic
analysts).
Few realized, however,  that mandated acreage  reductions for program
crops  (designed in large  part to  reduce budget exposure) might have other
undesired consequences.  One of the most important has  been to undermine  the
cost-effectiveness  of the Conservation Reserve  Program, mandated under a
separate  title of the Bill.  This  article analyzes  the nature of  the
conflict between the Acreage Reduction Program and the Conservation Reserve
Program in achieving  three objectives of agricultural  policy:  (1) supply
control,  (2) conservation of marginal  agricultural  lands,  and  (3) budget
discipline.
1First, we demonstrate  this conflict using farm-level examples  and 1986
program data. Second, we  offer an alternative targeting framework within
which agricultural  objectives and policy instruments can be  arrayed.
Finally, we propose legislative reforms  that would make both the  supply
control program and the conservation program more effective.
2Targets  and Instruments  in Agricultural  Policy
Although awide variety of objectives are advanced for agricultural
policy  (the  1985  Farm Bill notes at least  seven;  the conservation title
itself  lists another  seven),  we are concerned with three of principal
importance to  Congress and the USDA:  (1) supply control,  (2) conservation
of marginal  agricultural lands,  and (3)  budget discipline.  The first  two
are  explicit Farm Bill  goals;  the  third was implicit  throughout the debate.
These program goals were  intended to  be met by two principal policy
instruments  (programs): acreage reductions and a conservation reserve. But
the  links between instruments and objectives were muddled at best.
Supply control was  to be achieved in large part by the Acreage
Reduction Progam (ARP), whereby eligibility for loan and deficiency payments
is  made conditional on reductions  in acreage planted to program crops.1
Although the  intent is  supply control, the main effect of ARPs  is  to reduce
budget exposure by lowering the acreage  on which program benefits are  to be
paid.  The reason that ARPs generally fail to  control supply--well-known to
farmers but apparently not to policymakers--will be explored in greater
detail below.  Budget savings,  however, are more assured.  With July 1986
prices, loan rates and deficiency payments,  1985-86  costs  for price-support
program would be approximately $3-5  billion greater than in the  absence of
the ARP.  Hence, while aimed at both supply control and budget discipline,
it  is  the  latter rather than the  former objective which ARPs  succeed most  in
addressing.
The  second agricultural policy objective, conservation of marginal
agricultural lands,  was to be achieved by the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP).  Under  the CRP,  landowners  agree not  to produce on highly erodible
2 cropland  for ten years  in exchange for an annual CRP rental payment.
3Farmers  submit sealed bids  to  the USDA, indicating the acreage and the
amount per acre  they would be willing to accept annually in compensation for
retiring  the land.  The USDA then announces  the maximum accepted bid level
for  the multi-county pool  in which the  farm is  located.  All acres bid at
that rate  or  lower  in the pool are enrolled in the  CRP.
An axiom in economic policy analysis,  due  to Tinbergen  (1952),  holds
that  for each policy objective, there  should be at least one  instrument, and
that each instrument  should be  carefully designed  to  have maximum  impact on
its primary objective.  We have seen that the ARP violates  this  axiom,
insofar as  it attempts  to accomplish both supply control and budget
discipline, with a little conservation thrown in  as well.  The CRP is  also a
single  instrument with more than one objective.  Conservation and supply
control are built in, while budget discipline  is  implicit in  the bid
procedure.  As with the ARP, the  fact that  a single instrument is  intended
to meet multiple  objectives raises  immediate questions  of feasibility.  None
of  the objectives may be met.  There  is  already evidence  that  the CRP is
failing  to retire as  much marginal  land as  it  could, that  it does not
accomplish a great deal  of supply control, and that bids are much higher
than anticipated.
The CRP is  in  trouble not only because of the lack of  a clear match
between  instruments and objectives, but also because of  two  "program
externalities"  stemming from the concurrent operation of the  CRP and the
price support programs.  We call these the  "crowding out"  and the  "base
bite"  effects.  Both program externalities raise the  costs and reduce  the
effectiveness of the  CRP.
These externalities can be  illustrated from  the farmer's  perspective.
First,  consider the  crowding out effect.  Suppose  that a farmer signed up
4for the price  support program, which requires  a one-year corn acreage
reduction of 20 percent of corn base.  A farmer with  120 acres  of cropland
and 90 acres  of assigned corn base could plant 0.8*90-72  acres  to corn.  The
farmer must idle  18  acres  in order  to receive  deficiency and other program
payments  calculated on the historic yield from  72  acres of permitted corn
plantings.
Under these circumstances,  it  is  in  the farmer's  interest to  idle  the
most marginal acres first, because  these  acres  are least productive.
Consequently, the ARP's potential  impact  on commodity supply  is  reduced.
This "slippage" occurs because total farm income  is derived from a
combination of government payments and crop marketings.  The more bushels
that can be produced on the  acres actually planted, the higher will be farm
revenues.  Indeed, in  the past many farmers have been inclined to bring
marginal acres  into production just so-that  they will be available to'set
aside  at some later  date  (Christensen and Aines;  Heimlich;  Berner).
The  important consequence  of this slippage  is  that many CRP-eligible
acres are  idled under the ARP before they are  even considered for the  CRP.
This  "crowds out"  eligible acres  that might otherwise have entered the  CRP;
it  effectively lowers  the pool of eligible acres  for  the conservation
reserve and raises  the bids  received for CRP entry.  Slippage thus not only
frustrates supply control, but, through the crowding out effect, frustrates
conservation objectives as well.
The second program externality,  the  "base bite effect",  is  not
unintended;  it  was designed to  give  the CRP a supply control  impact.  For
each acre  entered into the reserve,  the aggregate farm acreage base is
reduced proportionately for the  10 years of the contract.  A 120 acre  farm
with a 90  acre  corn base will have  its base reduced by 1/120, or  .75  acres,
5for  each acre entered into the CRP.  A 10-acre  CRP entry would reduce our
farmer's assigned corn base  from 90  to  82.5;  this  new base would then be
subject to  the  20 percent ARP, resulting  in total permitted corn plantings
of 66  acres.  (The CRP acreage  itself  is  not  taken from corn plantings,
since  the crop acreage  base is an accounting, not a geographic entity.)
The result of CRP  participation, whether or  not marginal ARP  acres
are actually designated first, is that an additional 6 acres  (72-66) of corn
land must be idled.  This  effect, which  is  distinct from  the crowding out
effect, we  call  the  "base bite".  If  the  six additional corn acres  to be
idled are more productive than those which would be  idled under  the ARP
alone,  then the  opportunity cost of removing them from production will  also
be higher, and so will CRP bids.  In fact,  from the  farmer's perspective,
the  one-year marginal opportunity cost of CRP entry is.the  income  foregone
from  the most productive  acres entered  into either program. The fact  that
the  CRP  is  a 10 year contract makes putting productive acres  into  it  even
less  attractive, further lowering the prospect  that they will be retired at
any but high bid prices.
The ironic and troubling result of these program interactions  is  that
ARPs fail  to control  supply due  to  slippage, which in turn causes  the  CRP to
lose eligible  acres due  to  the crowding out effect.  In addition,  the base
bite effect raises  the opportunity cost of CRP participation and, thus,  CRP
bids.  These conflicts  frustrate both supply control and conservation
objectives at  the  same  time that  they make both programs  less cost-
effective.  The evidence from  the  first two rounds  of CRP bidding supports
this  argument.
6The  CRP Experience to  Date
Congress required that  five million acres be enrolled in  the CRP in
1986  and that an additional 40 million acres  to be added over  the succeeding
four years.  The USDA estimated that annual per-acre  CRP rental costs
(exclusive of cover-crop establishment) would average  $38-$44  (Ogg et al.
1984).  In order  to meet  the 5 million acre  goal  in 1986,  the Department
allocated $190  million.  When the  1986 bids were examined, however, most
were well above  initial estimates.  Agriculture  Secretary Lyng declared the
bulk of them "unreasonable" and authorized payment for only 838,000 acres,
at an average bid of $41.  Enrollments were far from uniformly distributed
across  states--Minnesota  and Colorado  alone accounted for  21%  of first-round
CRP acreage.
Inital  1986  CRP first-round experiences  for Minnesota and the nation
are shown in Figure  1.  The weighted average accepted bid (weighted  by acres
per bid)  is  for those bids that  fell under  the maximum accepted bid in each
pool.  These were substantially lower, closer to  the  initial USDA estimates,
because the Administration chose  to keep program outlays  "reasonable."  This
was accomplished at the expense of a great short-fall  in terms  of enrolled
acreage, however.
Figure  1:  CRP enrollments and bids:  United States  and Minnesota
First Round  Second and Third Rounds
Enrollment  Weighted Ave.  Enrollment  Weighted Ave.
(000 acres)  Bid Accepted ($)  (000 acres)  Bid Accepted ($)
Minnesota  79  48.21  215  49.13
United States  838  41.82  3001  44.23
7Figure 2 shows bid distributions  for  two representative Minnesota
multi-county pools.  Pool 1 is  an irrigated wheat region;  Pool  8 is a corn-
soybean region.  The  simple average bid tendered and the maximum accepted
bid are shown for comparison.  By limiting accepted bids  to  those
essentially  at or below prevailing cash rental rates,  the USDA denied CRP
participation to  the bulk of interested landowners.  High bids  should have
come  as no surprise, however, given the program externalties discussed above
and the fact  that  local cash rental  rates historically fail  to reflect
farmers' expected incomes from land, particularly in periods  of lucrative
price support programs.
The 1986  CRP enrollment period was subsequently reopened, and at  the
same time  early 1987 enrollments were accepted.  These second and third
rounds were much more  successful in attracting bids  at what USDA considered
to  be  reasonable levels.  Nationally, an additional  three million acres  and,
in Minnesota, an additional  215,000 acres  were added:  (These totals were
reported by USDA as  "1986 CRP enrollments."  Strictly speaking, however,
they include a great many acres  that will not be idled until the  1987  crop
year.)  The new CRP bids were still substantially above  initial USDA
estimates, however, now due not only to  the program externalities but also
to  the  learning behavior of farmers  in  the  first bounds.  Evidently
reflecting the  thinking that USDA would stick to  its relatively low first-
round maximum accepted bid, the distributions  of tendered bids narrowed
considerably.  Many more bids were  accepted, but there were  fewer bids made
at the very  low end.  Consequently, weighted average accepted bids increased
in the  second and third rounds  (Figure 1).  Figure 3 shows  the experience over  the  thr
rounds  in Minnesota Pools  1 and 8.
8Figure  2:  Distributions for  first-round CRP bids:
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9Figure  3:  Distributions  for three  CRP bidding rounds:
Minnesota Pools 1 and 8
Round
86-1  86-2  87-1
Pool  1:
Mean bid tendered  52.44  42.79  44.40
Wt.ave.bid tendered  53.60  44.07  45.87
Std.dev. bid tendered  19.74  8.79  7.83
Max. bid accepted  44.00  44.00  44.00
Mean bid accepted  36.27  39.93  40.54
Wt.ave. bid accepted  37.77  40.46  40.58
Pool  8:
Mean bid tendered  101.14  82.62  86.65
Wt.ave.bid tendered  84.57  81.76  85.68
Std.dev.mean bid tendered  46.53  17.50  17.48
Max. bid accepted  85.00  85.00  85.00
Mean bid accepted  69.95  77.18  80.03
Wt.ave.bid accepted  69.93  75.66  79.95
10Revised Targeting Criteria
In general  the more  attractive is  the price  support program, the more
expensive  it  is  for  the  government to acquire  CRP land.  This  is  due both  to
the crowding out effect, which reduces  the supply of CRP-eligible land and
forces any CRP acreage onto more productive  and more costly land, and to  the
base bite  effect, which shifts  the relevant  foregone income calculation from
the  CRP  acre to  the highest valued land removed from production.  If  the
base bite provision were removed from the  CRP legislation, as we propose
below, then the  individual CRP bids could be determined strictly  on the
basis of the marginal productivity of alternate crops.  Direct competition
with the price-support program would vanish, and total CRP acreage would
increase under a budget constraint.  To remove  the pernicious  effects of  the
crowding out externality,  one  or both programs must be revised to  exclude
from eligibility those  lands targeted for  the other program.  In this
section, we present a targeting scheme to accomplish  this reform.
The two program externalities can be eliminated if each program is
targeted to maximize  its impact upon a single objective---supply control  in
the case of the ARP and marginal  land conservation in the case of the CRP.
Such a targeting scheme  should employ two basic criteria for the  land in
question:  (1) its  inherent agricultural productivity and (2) its  inherent
capacity to resist soil erosion.  Both are quantifiable using data on crop
yields and measures of soil erodibility.  A variety of such measures  are
possible, and no specific measure need be used in every case.  All are
designed to overcome  the administrative rigidity and subjective qualities
associated with the now-traditional use of soil  erosion tolerance  levels  (T-
values)  in policy making.  For illustration, we here employ the
"productivity index"  and  "resistivity index" approach  developed in
11Minnesota by Larson and others  (See Runge,  Larson and Roloff, 1986).  The
productivity index  (PI)  indexes  soil according  to  its  suitability as  an
environment for plant roots;  it  is based on available water capacity, bulk
density, and pH.  The  index ranges from 0.0  to 1.0, where 1.0  is  associated
with  that soil  (within a given area of analysis)  that has  the best rooting
environment.  The resistivity  index  (RI) is  a measure of a soil's
vulnerability to  erosion;  it  is  based on topographic  factors  (RKLS)4 from
the Universal Soil Loss  Equation and on the degree of potential loss of
favorable rooting zone  as  the soil  is eroded. Wind erosion is accommodated
by incorporating factors  (ICL)5 from  the Wind Erosion Equation.  All  soils
are  ranked on a 0.0  to  1.0 scale, with 1.0 assigned to soils  extremely
resistant to  erosion-caused losses  in production.
Together, PI  and RI  allow any geographic areas  (farm, township, county,
state)  to be ranked on  the basis of their soils'  inherent productivity and
resistivity characteristics.  Land parcels  (or soil  classes) can be  thought
of as  falling into  one of four subsets, according  to each parcel's position
along PI  and RI  gradients, as  in Figure 4.6 This categorization permits us
to apply particular policy instruments  to each of the  three agricultural
policy objectives--supply control, conservation of marginal agricultural
lands,  and budget discipline.  We argue  that  the appropriate instruments  to
achieve each of the policy objectives are, respectively:  (1) the ARP, (2)
the  CRP,  and (3)  a land classification scheme designating productivity and
resistivity criteria for program coverage.  This matching permits a fully
identified set of three policy instruments with three policy objectives.
12Figure  4:  Locating soils  in productivity/resistivity space
RI
Non-resistant/  Resistant/
productive  (NRP)  productive  (RP)
(ARP)  (Encourage Production)
PI
Non-resistant/  Resistant/
Non-productive  (NRNP)  Non-productive  (RNP)
(CRP)  (Exclude from programs)
The logic underlying the  targeting of  these instruments  is
straightforward.  Soils  that are resistant to  erosion and highly
productive  (RP),  shown in the upper right-hand corner of  the diagram,
are precisely those  on which production should be  encouraged.  It  is  on
these  that the long-run comparative advantage of the United States  lies
as  an exporter and low-cost producer.  On less resistant but still
productive soils, erosion damage must be  compensated for by more costly
practices and higher levels of inputs.  Lands  that are both resistant to
erosion damage and non-productive  (RNP), shown in the  lower right-hand
corner,  are inappropriate as  targets  for either supply control  or soil
conservation, unless they have special features  (such as  rare wildlife
or habitat)  in which case a separate objective  (such as protected habitat)
is  appropriate.  A  strong argument can be made for the development of such
additional objectives, especially concerning off-site effects  of soil
erosion (See Crosson and Stout;  McSweeny and Kramer).
In the upper left-hand corner of the diagram are  soils that are non-
resistant and productive (NRP).  It  is  on these that ARPs should first be
applied.  There are  three reasons  for this  matching.  First, because  they
are productive,  idling  of these  soils will  result in larger and more  cost-
13effective  supply reductions  than would idling less productive  soils,  as  is
presently permitted.  Slippage is  thereby reduced.  While ARPs on more
resistant RP soils may be justified in the name of supply control  as  well,
it makes  sense to begin idling the more vulnerable NRP soils  first, working
into more resistant soils along  the RI gradient only as  surpluses  become
intolerable.  The second reason to apply  the ARP first to  NRP lands  is  that
it  is  cheaper to  idle  these soils under the ARP than it would be  to retire
them under  the CRP--simply because  they are more productive  and, hence, more
costly.  Overall market value increases  as one moves up and to  the  right on
the  diagram.  Budget discipline is  possible more by the coercive power of
the ARP than by the use  of the voluntary CRP process.  The  third argument  in
favor of the ARP on NRP soils,  as  opposed to NRNP soils,  is  one  of
management flexibility.  In contrast  to  the 10-year CRP contract, the  1-year
ARP requirement  allows supply control  to  ebb  and flow on a yearly cycle in
response to  supply conditions, relaxing in times of relative  shortfall and
increasing in times of surplus.  In particular, in the event of national or
international emergencies,  it may be justifiable  to  crop previously idled
non-resistant but productive  soils.
In the  lower left-hand corner of the diagram are  lands  that are non-
resistant and non-productive  (NRNP).  It  is  on these lands  that the  CRP
should concentrate.  Because  they are relatively unproductive but highly
vulnerable to  erosion, their retirement will be  the most cost-effective way
to maximize soil conservation for  a given amount of retired acreage without
reducing the  amount of productive  lands under cultivation.  Also, precisely
because they  are unproductive, they will cost less to bring into the  CRP.
14A Proposal  for Legislative Reform
The  land targeting scheme outlined in the previous  section provides  a
basis for  three key  reforms in  the Farm Bill.  These reforms would improve
the  capacity of federal government to  (a)  control supply;  (b)  promote
conservation and  (c)  reduce  the costs  of current programs.  Some of  the
necessary changes  could be  effected administratively, without specific
Congressional authorization.
First,  acreage reduction programs  should be restricted  to high
productivity-low  resistivity lands,  and the conservation reserve  should
focus on  low productivity-low resistivity lands.  If additional  supply
control  is  necessary, then ARPs could be extended on a year-to-year basis  to
more resistant soils,  but only after all  lower resistance soils  are  set
aside.  One option would be to  introduce a 3-5 year ARP for  lands  in  the
high productivity-low resistivity category, midway between the  10 year CRP
and 1 year ARPs on more  resistant soils.  Such a scheme  is  outlined by
Berner.
Second, those  lands eligible for  the CRP should be declared ineligible
for  the ARP.  (The converse, however, would not hold.  Higher productivity
land with low resistivity could still be entered into the  10 year CRP).  By
de-coupling program  eligibility  in this manner, the crowding out effect
would be eliminated, thereby raising the pool of eligible  acres  for the  CRP,
reducing CRP bids,  and lowering overall program costs.
Third, current provisions attempting to make  the CRP an instrument of
supply  control  (the base bite)  should be eliminated.  Enrollment  in the  CRP
should not be tied  to reductions  in farm acreage base.
All  three proposals would lower the cost of the CRP and let ARPs more
effectively control  supply.  Contrast this approach  and the  status quo,
15in which slippage brings unproductive soils  into the ARP, frustrating  supply
control and, by the  crowding out  effect, forcing the CRP  to pick up more
productive and more costly acres, acres made even more expensive by the base
bite. With ARPs targeted directly at productive land,  the CRP could be left
to  focus on its primary objective:  conservation.
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The Farm Bill provides  three  instruments  to control  supply--acreage
limitations,  set-asides, and required diversions.  All  three, often used
interchangeably in the  literature, require  that the  farmer not plant  some
cropland, in exchange for  government subsidies.  A "set-aside program" would
require that  the farmer not plant a particular proportion of  "planted
acres."  An "acreage limitation program" would require  that  the farmer not
plant a particular proportion of the  "crop acreage base."  "Required
diversions"  are additional to  the other two and might be tied either to base
or  to planted acres.  For  1986,  the USDA implemented an acreage limitation
program with a small required diversion tied to base.  The distinctions are
important to  the extent that  the base--which is  the average  of several-years
of planted and considered-planted acres--differs  from planted acres, which
is  a one-year record only. All three  supply-control mechanisms are subsumed
under the  rubric  "Acreage Reduction Program" in this paper.
CRP eligibility is  restricted to those  lands currently cropped in  SCS
capability classes VI-VIII, or currently-cropped class  II-V lands  that are
eroding at more than three times  the SCS-determined tolerance rate  ("3-T" or
greater).  There are  an estimated 60-70 million acres of such land
nationwide,  45 million acres  of which are mandated by legislation  to be
retired over a five year period.
17NOTES  (Con't):
It  is  important  to  note that any 72  of  the  120 acres  of cropland on
the farm could be planted to corn, and that any 18 could be  idled. Program
participants are  paid the difference between a crop's  target price and the
actual price  (or loan rate,  if higher).  A farm's  official  crop acreage base
is  an accounting entity used by ASCS  to  determine the magnitude of the
deficiency payments  for  that commodity, based on historic planting records.
The base  is not  a geographical designation.  Hence,  a particular acre should
not be  thought of as  a "base acre" or a "non-base acre".  Deficiency
payments are calculated for  output  "grown" on the  farm's established base  at
the established base yield.  The  farmer can plant no more of a program crop
than the established base in that crop,  less  any ARP, although a farm may
have bases  for more than one crop.  There  are  incentives  to plant
considerably less  than permitted acreage, which is  the base less  any
required acreage reduction, but we  ignore  these.  Here, planted acreage
equals permitted acreage.
4R-rainfall and runoff;  K-soil erodibility;  L-slope length;
S=slope steepness.
5 I-soil erodibility;  C-climatic factor;  L-unsheltered distance.
6 The RI and PI  indexes disentagle two components of the  Soil
Conservation Service's  land capability classification  (LCC)  system.  The
bulk of LCC class  IV-VIII  soils  lie  in the  lower-left quadrant of Figure  5.
18NOTES  (Con't):
7The particular definition of productivity and resistivity need not be
confined to  the  indexes used in Minnesota, nor  to any given level of these
criteria.  Given a particular set  of supply control,  conservation and budget
goals,  the  level at which PI  and RI are  "cut"  to determine program coverage
is  flexible.  In Minnesota, for  example, a state conservation reserve
program has been developed which makes eligible only those lands  located
among the lowest  25 percent of each gradient.  (The Minnesota program also
sets  state payments at 90 percent of the average accepted CRP bid to  avoid
state revenues being spent when federal revenues would otherwise be
committed.)  As another example, a CRP might be designed for  low RI but mid-
range  PI  lands,  on the  supposition that market forces  will automatically
retire  the  lowest PI  lands on their own  (low) merits.
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